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Abstract 
The aim of this contribution is to provide a state-of-the-art concerned with the mental 
representation of counterfactual thinking. Counterfactuals are defined from the perspective of 
cognitive psychology as reasoning processes that consider alternative situations to a factual 
situation. That is, counterfactual thoughts are conditional thoughts that negate a given fact. 
Therefore, the key problem of counterfactual mental representation is the representation of 
negation, its mental modeling and derived inferences. In this context, four prominent findings 
and three main open issues are revised. Our main conclusion states that counterfactual 
representation is a function of working memory load and probably operates on the basis of an 
abstraction gradient. That is, iconic representations might suffice for lower loads and 
abstract representations might be required for higher working memory loads. Suggestions for 
a research agenda on counterfactuals are presented. Such agenda is concerned with further 






What would have happened if Germany and Japan won World War II? Philip K. Dick [1] wrote a 
classic novel based on this counterfactual thought. That is, a counterfactual is a conditional 
reasoning that assumes an alternative to a given fact [2], which can be actual or imaginary. The role 
of counterfactuals in human reasoning is concerned with explanation of the past, preparation for the 
future, imagination of causal relation, elaboration of emotion and intention, and decision making 
[3]. In the context of human thinking research, counterfactuals are important because they provide 
critical information about representation and inference. Particularly, counterfactuals are critical to 
understand negation [2,4]. 
Counterfactuals are conditional utterances like “if the flowers had been roses, the trees would have 
been orange trees” [2]. Imagine, for example, that this utterance appears in a conversation between 
a speaker and a hearer about a garden with flowers and trees. The mental representation of the 
hearer automatically includes the counterfactual and the presupposed facts: 
 Counterfactual:   roses   orange trees 
 Presupposed facts:    no roses  no orange tress 
Such dual mental representation of counterfactuals has been found and extensively replicated in 
reasoning experiments [3]. As it can be seen in this example, the abstract representation of negation 
is required to produce counterfactuals. It is mandatory to generate the presupposed facts in mind. 
Even if the contextual information defines two possibilities like “lilies or roses”, and the presence 
of lilies is counterfactually derived from the denial of roses, the operation of negation requires 
abstraction. That is, negation implies abstraction. Hence, any psychological account of 
counterfactuals requires the description and explanation of abstract inferential processes. However, 
the most comprehensive and robust evidence-based current theory of human thinking makes 




emphasis on concrete components, iconicity, and the management of low loaded working memory 
processes [5]. That is, the Mental Models Theory or MMT [5,6,7] holds that mental representation 
proceeds by imaginary scenarios that are so iconic, simplified, and affirmative as possible. Mental 
models include only what is true and affirmative. Only a second stance process, the explicit mental 
modeling might flesh out what is false, negations and other complex components that remain 
implicit in the initial mental modeling [6]. 
These considerations suggest that the central problem of counterfactuals is the problem of negation, 
which is one possible variety of abstraction. Hence, a sound theory of counterfactuals requires an 
adequate account for negation as abstraction in mental representation and derived inference 
processes. Such advancement has been successfully started by the MMT. That is, the representation 
of abstract negation has been postulated for the mental modeling of counterfactuals as a tag to 
initial models. These annotated models are supported by coherent theory and robust experimental 
evidence. However, some issues can be detected in the current state of knowledge.  
This contribution continues as follows. First, we review the four main discoveries concerned with 
the psychology of counterfactuals based on experimental evidence. Then, we outline three open 
research issues that will probably guide the near future of this research field. Finally, we discuss 
our findings concerned with the current state-of-the-art on counterfactual reasoning. 
 
Main Discoveries Concerned With Counterfactuals: Dual Representation 
The mental representation of counterfactual reasoning is a hard task because it requires the 
consideration of the presupposed facts and the counterfactual itself, that is, the alternative 
information explicitly included in the counterfactual utterance [2]. Its dual nature stems from 
negation, which is psychologically hard to account for [8]. Counterfactuals are also a variety of a 
conditional, which is associated to a complex psychological phenomenon that includes an explicit 
mental model and the mention of further implicit models in the context of the MMT [6]. That is, the 
indicative conditional of the form “if there are roses, then there are orange trees” can be represented 
by means of explicit and implicit mental models. 
 Explicit models   roses   orange trees 
 Implicit models        … 
That is, the three dots notation used in the context of the model theory [7] indicates that further 
models are detected, but not explicitly represented. Psychologically, indicative conditionals do not 
include all the possibilities stated by sentential logic, which includes: 
 Truth table    roses   orange trees 
      no roses   orange trees 
      no roses  no orange trees 
The last two rows explicitly indicate that the negation of the antecedent generates true conditionals 
according to logic. However, such situation is only implicitly noted when building mental models 
up.  
Hence, the complexity of counterfactuals for the MMT stems from its dual nature, which can be 
considered as the representation of two models. Furthermore, three additional research findings 
have been derived from such duality. These findings are concerned with facilitation effects, 
embodied negation contributions, and the inference-to-alternates effect. 
 
Facilitation Effects  
The evidence obtained from several experiments [4] suggests that counterfactuals are mentally 
represented by means of specific patterns. That is, counterfactual information and presupposed 
facts. Given such representation pattern, some facilitation effects have been observed. 
Counterfactuals such as “If there have been roses, the trees would have been orange trees” prime 
conjunctions like “no roses and no orange trees”. This priming can be understood as an acceleration 
effect in the processing of a conjunction after processing a counterfactual [3]. Several facilitation 
affects have been experimentally tested. Briefly, counterfactuals of the form “if there have been x, 
then there would have been y” facilitate conjunctions of the form “no x and no y” [4]. “x” and “y” 




refer to atomic propositions. Therefore, further atomic evidence is needed to argue in favor of such 
facilitation effects. Particularly, a direct evaluation of the priming effects of counterfactuals on the 
atomic components of the studied conjunctions is needed. That is, the acceleration in the processing 
of “no x and no y” is a compound of “no x” and “no y”, which also have to be facilitated when 
compared to “x” and “y”. This issue provides a specific item for the research agenda in 
counterfactual research.  
 
Embodied Negation Contributions  
Two fundamental contributions to the understanding of counterfactuals have been found in the 
context of embodied negation theory. One is concerned with the representation of presupposed 
facts in binary contexts and the other with a disembodiment effect of negation for action verbs. 
Embodied theories of cognition conjectures that mental representation is experiential, that is, 
necessary connected to sensorial modalities, which implies a strong link to lower abstraction level 
rather than a higher level of abstraction. Therefore, for binary contexts in which only two 
possibilities are available, the negation of one of them triggers the preference for the other 
possibility. The alternate is preferred instead of negation itself. That is, for contexts like “x or y”, 
when further information brings “no x”, then “y” is preferred instead of “no x”. This might happen 
because “no x” is an abstraction and “y” is nearer to a concrete experience than any abstraction. 
However, such alternates preference can also be explained by the MMT as a particular case of an 
inference-to-alternates effect [2], that is, a consequence of representing annotated mental models. 
A disembodiment effect has been observed when verbs that imply a body movement are included 
in negative utterances like the ones compatible with counterfactuals. That is, body action utterances 
that activate specific brain areas related to such processes are deactivated when such utterances are 
negated [9]. However, it is not clear how abstraction can be represented according to the embodied 
negation theories. Furthermore, such view of mental representation fails to predict the inference-to-
alternates effect for multiple context counterfactuals, that is, situations that include alternatives like 
“x or y or z” instead of a dual context like “x or y” [2]. 
In sum, an embodied theoretical approach to counterfactuals needs further development and 




Contexts are critical to understand counterfactuals. Binary contexts like the ones that include two 
variables, “x or y”, trigger different phenomena than multiple contexts like those including three or 
more variables like “x or y or z”. A strong facilitation of the alternate has been found for binary 
contexts, while the preference for an abstract representation of negation has been observed for 
multiple contexts. That is, “no x” facilitates “y” in binary context, but the same negation promotes 
“no x” itself instead of “y” or “z” in multiple contexts [2]. An important conclusion can be derived 
from this finding. The abstract representation of negation implies a lower working memory load 
than the iconic representation of all the alternates, which are “y” and “z” in this example. Since the 
human mind prefers lower memory loads than higher ones, abstract representations are selected 




The Threshold Issue 
Human working memory is a very limited cognitive resource [6,7]. Since reasoning requires the 
intensive use of working memory, an important problem concerned with thinking is such limited 
condition [5]. Counterfactual thinking seems to operate according to a gradient of working memory 
load [2]. A lower use of such resources seems to trigger iconic representations, that is, sensorial or 
experiential information related to the topics studied by the embodied cognition theories [10]. A 
higher load of working memory seems to require the use of symbolic representations, e.g., a mental 




model with a tag of negation [11]. For example, instead of representing “no oranges” by means of 
representing “apples” or “grapes”, our mental modeling might require the representation of “no 
oranges”, that is “oranges” with a negation tag that operates symbolically [2]. In such case, a 
threshold issue becomes relevant [12]. How much information can hold the iconic processing when 
dealing with counterfactuals? Where is the limit in memory load that triggers the shift from iconic 
representation to symbolic representation? Is this all about individual differences or a 
psychophysics approach might be available [13] for specific tasks, materials, or domains? Is such 
threshold nomothetic or only idiographic? These questions require answers based on further 
experimental evidence. 
 
The Linguistic Issue 
It is well documented that reasoning with negation is a very difficult cognitive task [13,14,15,16]. 
However, such difficulty might stem from its representation, but also from prior linguistic issues 
[17]. That is, the experimental paradigm often applied to test hypotheses about counterfactuals 
typically uses compound sentences as primes and then requires inferences as targets related to such 
sentences. Many studies suggested that language processing difficulties might generate shallow 
responses [15,16]. That is, it has been observed perseverations, fast selections of response options 
that lack semantic processing, or simply a response that neglects the task instructions in reasoning 
experiments. Therefore, further evidence is required to discard in each experimental paradigm a 
linguistic explanation of counterfactual reasoning. That is, an adequate experimental paradigm is 
needed to reject objections concerned with the pure linguistic difficulty as responsible for the 
observed response patterns. One possible strategy to elaborate on this issue is to ovoid compound 
response options, which are typical in counterfactual experiments. That is, a prime constructed as a 
set of contextual sentences is followed by a prime constructed as a compound sentence connected 
by the disjunction operator “or”. Hence, the selection of a response option is mediated by the 
representation of such compound operator. For example, “oranges or apples” [4] has been often 
used as a response option. By the opposite, if the response is simplified by means of atomic 
sentences, for example “oranges”, then some linguistic issues can be solved. If “no oranges” as 
prime leads to a response pattern of “oranges” as target instead of “apples” when a reasoning task is 
involved, then the answer might be linguistically guided instead of being the result of a cognitive 
inference. Such shallow phenomenon can be understood as the counterfactual correlate to the 
matching bias response in the classic paradigm of the Wason Selection Task [7], which can be 
interpreted as a linguistic phenomenon rather than a reasoning phenomenon. 
 
The Abstract Representation Issue 
The Mental Models Theory of human thinking is based on imagery rather than logic [18]. That is, 
this modeling account assumes that our mental representation is iconic, or at least so iconic as 
possible rather than abstract. Therefore, abstraction remains somehow as a strange process. That is, 
we can imagine a world in which oranges are given, but we cannot clearly imagine a world where 
oranges are not given. We can instead imagine a world where apples are given, which is an implicit 
negation of oranges. The explicit representation of “no oranges” requires concrete replacements for 
oranges to avoid conflict with the iconicity of mental models. Hence, a tag for negation is required. 
That is, a lower abstraction representation must also include a higher abstraction annotation to 
include negation, which is an abstract function [8]. Moreover, such shift in the models’ theory that 
includes a tag for negation approaches to a rival account, the set of formal logic theories of human 
thinking that includes explicit mental representation of negation [19,20]. The later set of theories 
consider that the operation of negation is basic or fundamental. Negation is not a tag added to an 
iconic representation. It might be rather a primitive component of human thought. In sum, the 
inclusion of a negation tag in the mental models’ theory requires further theoretical elaboration 
based on recent experimental evidence [2,8,11,13].This issue needs to be elaborated on to preserve 
the internal consistency of the mental models’ theory, which is the more comprehensive and robust 
evidence-based account to describe and explain human thinking [2,6]. 





We argue that the state-of-the-art in the psychology of counterfactuals requires a research agenda 
based on four main discoveries and three open issues. It has been found that counterfactuals rely on: 
1) a dual mental representation, 2) selective facilitation effects, 3) the iconicity of mental imagery 
studied by embodied theories of cognition, and 4) a cognitive inferential effect that prefers the 
alternate option in binary context, but not in multiple contexts. The main issues are concerned with: 
1) a threshold between iconicity and abstraction, 2) linguistic restrictions that include syntactic, 
semantic and pragmatic components, and 3) the representation of abstraction in a model that relies 
heavily on iconicity. 
We propose for such agenda both theoretical and experimental challenges [21]. Further theoretical 
elaboration is needed to clearly include the representation of abstraction in the Mental Models 
Theory of human thinking. The “tag” of negation added to an iconic representation seems to operate 
iconically, but also as an abstract operator. Therefore, further philosophical distinctions and 
precisions are required to define the epistemic status of such tag. Negation is central for 
counterfactuals. Hence, the conceptual elaboration of its representation is critical for the 
understanding of such duality. Similarly, further experimental design insights are needed to reject 
alternative linguistic explanations. In particular, a task design strategy that breaks the classic 
disjunction response option into its atomic components might solve several problems. Facilitation 
experiments based on disjunctions of the form “x or y” need to be replicated using “x” and “y” as 
separate, but not exclusive, response options. 
The lack of the aforementioned theoretical elaboration might produce the atomization of the Mental 
Models Theory. That is, the problem of abstraction might generate separate theories to account for 
iconic processes by one side, and theories of abstraction by the other side. Similarly, the lack of the 




The inspection of the current state of knowledge concerning counterfactual research suggests that: 
1) Counterfactual representation seems to be a function of working memory load. 2) It probably 
operates on the basis of an abstraction gradient. That is, iconic representations suffice for lower 
loads, but abstract representations might be required for higher working memory loads. 3) A 
specific research agenda can be proposed to promote the advancement of counterfactuals research. 
Both theoretical and experimental developments are required to understand representation and 
inference of counterfactual thinking.  
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